JACKSONVILLE, Fla. – The captain of the ill-fated cargo ship El Faro got an eight-hour heads up that a hurricane was ahead of him before the ship sank, according to an attorney for Capt. Michael Davidson’s wife.
That information came out Thursday during questions and testimony before a U.S. Coast Guard panel investigating whether misconduct or other problems led to the ship's sinking in 15,000 feet of water near the Bahamas.
The 790-foot-long El Faro sank Oct. 1 after losing propulsion while sailing from Jacksonville to San Juan, Puerto Rico. The ship was hit by Hurricane Joaquin and all 33 crew aboard died.
The attorney also said during the hearings at the Prime Osborn Convention Center that where Hurricane Joaquin and El Faro met was more than 100 miles off the storm’s forecast path.
DOCUMENT: Full schedule of hearing
A former second mate on board El Faro testified Thursday that he exchanged text messages with Davidson about the formation of the storm and the captain's plans to avoid it during the ship's final voyage.
Charles Baird, who now serves on El Faro's sister ship, El Yunque, said that in the past, the ship would take a different course to avoid storms.
Baird, who was on vacation when El Faro set sail for the final time, testified that he was at home watching television and saw on The Weather Channel that a tropical storm was developing in the Atlantic Ocean.
He said he immediately sent a text to Davidson to find out if he was aware of the storm. Davidson responded that he was and thanked Baird.
Baird said that as the storm strengthened that day, he sent another text to Davidson, asking what the captain's plan was for sailing around the storm.
“He replied back to me that he was going to do the normal route and try to go underneath the storm, so go south of the storm,” Baird said. “The storm was projected to head north, so he was planning on going underneath the storm, going south of it and continuing on his way.”
The panel asked Baird for copies of those text messages, which he said are still on his phone.
Baird said that he was not aware that the first forecast to advise Davidson of the storm came eight hours before the ship sank.
Baird also testified that the ship did not have a working wind speed meter, saying the crew monitored wind by looking at things like white caps on the waves.
An attorney for Davidson's wife said that because no one on land knew what was happening out at sea with the ship, they have to trust that Davidson was making the right decision based on the information he was receiving.
The attorney asked Baird if the weather forecast for the entire voyage was incorrect, if that would be a significant factor.
“That's affirmative, yes,” Baird said.
Baird described Davidson as very meticulous and receptive to ideas about changing course.
Baird also said crew members had life suits in their cabins and hatches were left open if people were working in those areas during normal weather. He said people were likely too lazy to open and close them every time. He said abandon ship drills were routine.
“With any lowering of the boats, we also discuss how to launch the life rafts,” Baird said. “That’s just standard operating procedure for any fire and boat drill.”
Baird was asked if TOTE, which owns El Faro, had ever requested a captain to change course because of bad weather a ship might encounter. He said they hadn't and that it’s up to the captain to decide.
Capt. Earl Loftfield, captain of El Yunque, also testified Thursday. He said that he too has sailed near hurricanes, but that the deciding factor for when to change course isn’t wind speed, but rather how the ship is responding.
"There’s not a straightforward (standard) that this is the wind speed that the ship can handle," Loftfield said. "It’s more a function of what happens with the sea and swell and whether there’s more then one swell, whether the vessel can actually be steered in a comfortable non-threatening manner."
He said that other than some minor factors, El Faro and El Yunque were identical. He said that they are much heavier than newer ships are, but that they routinely travel with 12,000 tons of cargo on board.
Loftfield said that as cargo is loaded, calculations are done to make sure that stability is still within requirements.
He said that Tote has never required one of his ships to reduce cargo in anticipation of heavy weather, but that they have cargo securing procedures.
Pastor Robert Green, whose son died on El Faro, questioned why El Faro took an alternate route earlier in the hurricane season, but not when Hurricane Joaquin was swirling in the ocean.
"It sounded like it was pretty much predicted they would make a move away from the storm," Green said. "Certainly the Bahama channels come up as a route taken previously, and I guess the question that would come up in my mind is why wasn’t that route taken on Hurricane Joaquin trip."
El Faro captain refused vacation before ill-fated voyage
Davidson refused to take vacation the day before his ill-fated voyage because he wanted to use the time off to be home for his 25th wedding anniversary, according to testimony Wednesday.
Head of labor relations for Tote Services Inc. Mick Kondracki said he emailed Davidson about using vacation time on the day before El Faro left port in Jacksonville. Davidson lived in Maine.
"He wanted to stay onboard so he could be home for his 25th wedding anniversary," Kondracki said, his voice breaking from emotion. "It shows what a great guy he was."
Testimony also revealed that Tote sent a company-wide safety alert out about a hurricane last summer, but did not send one before Joaquin.
Phil Greene, CEO and president of Tote Services, said safety personnel sent out an alert for Hurricane Danny last summer only because it was the first hurricane of the season. Investigators pointed out that Danny was the fourth named storm of the season, and questioned why no similar alert was sent out before Joaquin.
A tropical storm gets a name when it reaches sustained winds of 39 mph. It becomes a hurricane at 74 mph.
Greene said the alert was sent out before the earlier storm "in recognition of first hurricane of the season to remind all our vessels in all oceans to take the action of reviewing their plans."
Lee Peterson, director of safety and marine operations for Tote, said he sometimes tracked storms and ships from his office onshore, but wasn't do it for Joaquin. He was unaware if anyone else was watching the storm that became an intense Category 4 hurricane, with winds of at least 130 mph.
It is unclear why Davidson chose to take a route closer to the storm's path rather than a longer, safer route that he had taken during previous storms such as Tropical Storm Erika. Investigators have not been able to recover the ship's "black box" which would have recordings from the bridge that might shed light on that decision. The National Transportation Safety Board said it is planning to search the wreckage again in an attempt to find it.
"Do you know why the vessel would go southbound on the late August voyage ... through the Old Bahama Channel then choose to go (a different route) for Hurricane Joaquin," asked Coast Guard Cmdr. Mike Odom, a technical adviser to the board.
"I wish I could answer that," Peterson said.
According to Greene, it was the captain's responsibility to make sure the ship and its crew were safe, not onshore personnel. That includes choosing which route to take in bad weather.
"The authority for voyage planning resides with the master," Greene said. "It's at the master's discretion to determine the best track."
Greene also testified about the corporate structure of his company but sidestepped many questions, saying those issues never would have made it to his level.
He said El Faro was owned by Tote Maritime Puerto Rico, which is a third-party client of Tote Services. He said his company provides a service; it does not own assets.
“It seems to me like Adm. Greene is trying to distance himself and his company from Tote Puerto Rico, while at the same time saying that they share the same office, they have an open-office policy, they see each other on a daily basis, but they’re our client,” maritime attorney Rod Sullivan said. “I think they are trying to distance Tote Services from Tote Maritime and put it all off on the captain.”
Sullivan, who attended the hearings Wednesday, said he doesn’t fault Greene for testifying how he did, but the evidence doesn't back Greene's testimony.
Enoch Webster, a former crew member on El Faro, said he was frustrated to hear so much responsibility being placed on the captain.
“In one instance, I think I heard him say there were problems with the captain’s judgment. This was last night on the news, but when they asked him a little before recess today, they said in certain circumstances the captain has the wherewithal to make those decisions because the captain is the on-scene commander,” Webster said. “I didn’t like what I heard.”
Peterson testified that there were weekly lifeboat drills conducted on El Faro. But he said that if a bad drill took place, there was no protocol to report it to the company. He also said that he had not seen the company’s risk assessment for hurricane avoidance.
U.S. Rep. Corrine Brown was on hand for the hearings Wednesday. She said that she was there because she is a member of the Transportation Committee and wants to make sure that nothing like this ever happens again.
“You’ve got a great team, and I just want to get the outcome of that team,” Brown said. “The Coast Guard and the board, they do an excellent job. And closure, I was there the entire time, and I think it’s very important that we get to the bottom of it.”
Since El Faro sank, Tote has instituted new weather-tracking technology on its ships. Many on the panel asked Wednesday why that type of technology wasn't in place before.
The hearing resumes Thursday and lasts through next week. The Coast Guard will hold another hearing later this year, and release a report. It can bring civil charges, and can forward any evidence of criminal wrongdoing to the U.S. Department of Justice for review.
The hearing is open to the public and streamed live on News4Jax.com.